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Abstract 
Conventional (commercial) insurance involves an intolerable magnitude of gharar 
(uncertainty), and hence its prohibition in Shariah. In order to Islamize insurance, it needs 
to be reconstructed on different basis so that the inherent uncertainty associated with the 
concept of insurance will not invalidate its contracts. This is thought to be doable only if 
the commutative nature (mu’awada) of insurance is converted into donation (tabarru’); 
deeming the contributions of the policy holders as mutual donations, with the Takaful 
company being only responsible for the administration of the Takaful fund as well as the 
Takaful operations. Nevertheless, the existing Takaful structures, which supposedly adopt 
the said methodology, still have unresolved Fiqh issues. These issues pertain to the 
underlying concept of Takaful being genuinely of donation nature and also to the 
applications and practices of Takaful being capable of substantially ascertaining their 
differences from those of the conventional insurance. The paper comes to scrutinize the 
existing Takaful structures and highlight their shortcomings in an attempt to outline a new 
sound model, with a special emphasis on its practicalities and applications.  
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Introduction 
Commercail insurance is a business with profit-maximization objective. Profit materializes when 
there is an underwriting Surplus, i.e. when the total premiums exceed the total claims. However, 
the total claims amount is left to uncontrollable and unmanageable factors, which renders the 
outcome of this business similar to gambling. If no loss occurs, the insurer pays nothing against 
the premium already paid by the policy holder, but if loss occurs the policy holder receives much 
larger payment compared with the small premium he has paid to the insurer. This uncertainty in 
insurance is called in Shariah terms “gharar”, and gharar, when excessive, is prohibited in 
financial dealings and it leads to their invalidity. Although Shariah tolerates the minor gharar, 
the type of gharar involved in the commercial insurance is excessive and consequently, 
conventional insurance is banned by Shariah. The issue of what constitutes a major gharar is not 
free from debate in Fiqh literature, but the amount of gharar involved in insurance is beyond 
dispute, since it is big enough to render the insurance contract a gambling contract. 
Takaful, as a Shariah-compliant alternative to conventional insurance1, is not free from 
gharar either, but it is claimed that Takaful is based on the concept of donation, and gharar, big 
or small, does not invalidate contracts of tabarru’ (donation). The second part of the claim is 
true, as it is commonly held in Shariah that gharar is tolerated in contracts of donations2, but the 
claim that Takaful is based on donation is debatable from different aspects.  
First, donation (tabarru’) implies that the thing donated cannot return, in whole or part, to the 
donor. Once one donates something it departs one’s ownership and becomes the property of the 
beneficiary.  However, the donor in Takaful will practically get his donation back when the loss 
befalls him, since he gets an unallocated amount from the Takaful fund. 
Second, the intention of the participants is not practically that of donation. In fact, all policy 
holders contribute their premiums only to cover themselves, and they have no intention 
whatsoever of donating their premiums to any party. 
Third, a donation is not a donation if it is in exchange of another donation, like “I donate to 
you if you donate to me”, and this is the case with the existing models of Takaful where we have 
mutual commitments of donations; one from the policy holders and the other from the Takaful 
fund. 
For the said reasons and some others, constructing Takaful on the notion of tabarru’ harbors 
some controversies on which this paper elaborates in an attempt to set the outlines of what 
constitute a controversy-free Takaful model. 
 
Concept and Structure of Takaful 
Takaful, or Islamic Insurance, can be defined as a kind of cooperative insurance, which covers 
different types of risks, under the management of a specialized company that adheres to the rules 
and principles of Shariah. 
In Takaful the participants (policy holders) contribute their premiums to a fund (the Takaful 
fund) to be managed and administered by the Takaful operator. The Takaful operator managing 
the fund is normally a joint stock company responsible for managing the Takaful operations as 
well as investing the assets of the fund against fees. The resources of this fund are used to 
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indemnify any participant who suffers from the loss insured against. To sum up, the Takaful 
company does the following:  
- Managing the Takaful (insurance) operations. 
- Investing the assets of the fund. 
Unlike in conventional insurance, the operator in Takaful does not own the fund, but rather it 
is entrusted with the job of administering it for the benefit of the participants. If the operator does 
not own the fund, then it does not own the surplus of the fund either, and it should dispose it 
according to the agreement with the policy holders. However, the Takaful operator in return of 
its administration of the Takaful operations and fund receives fees that can be determined upfront 
and hence the profit. On the other hand, the Takaful operator, being a mere agent, is not 
responsible for any shortfall in the fund; if the compensations exceed the premiums then it is not 
the responsibility of the operator to cover the fiscal deficit. In this case, the operator can demand 
further contributions from the participants or terminate the policies.  
This is the structure of Takaful in brief, but although the above summary sounds simple and 
straightforward it contains many debatable Shariah issues to the extent that they may jeopardize 
the very legitimacy of Takaful if not resolved correctly. All issues will be discussed in this paper. 
 
The Advantages of Takaful in Comparison with the Conventional Insurance  
To the Takaful operator, the profit return of the Takaful business is guaranteed since the fees can 
be determined upfront, so the operator does not need to worry about the risk of not making profit 
let alone undergoing a loss. However, on the other hand, the operator may make more profit 
under conventional insurance if he was fortunate enough to be demanded less claims. 
To the policy holders, Takaful grants them the chance of getting refunded some of their 
premiums at the end of the year through redistribution of the surplus. However, on the other 
hand, the operators is not responsible towards the  policy holders for any deficit in the Takaful 
fund, which is not the case with the conventional insurance where the operator is committed to 
cover all claims despite the deficit. 
Thus, each type of insurance has its advantages and disadvantages to its parties but Takaful 
remains in the final analysis more consistent with the norms of justice to all parties. 
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Shariah Analysis of Insurance 
The following discussions highlight the Shariah issues in the insurance business in general for 
the objective of building a proper understanding of the Shariah principles governing insurance 
and then identifying the elements that need to be worked on to structure a sound Takaful model. 
 
Insurance and Gharar 
INSURANCE INVOLVES GAMBLING 
Gharar, which is uncertainty in contract whether in its very execution or in any of its elements, 
is prohibited in Islam for a variety of reasons; it may cause dispute between the contracting 
parties and may lead to unjust enrichment of one contracting party at the expense of the other. 
Gambling is an obvious application and example of gharar; the winner in a gambling game 
seizes the other players’ money in a game of luck. When trying his luck, the gambler pays an 
amount of money in exchange of an uncertain value. He may win and he may lose, so he may get 
the counter value he has put his money on or he may not. This is an intolerable uncertainty that 
invalidates contracts from Shariah perspective, not to mention the zero-sum-game nature of 
gambling where the gain of one is the loss of others. Undoubtedly, the concept of insurance in 
general, be it Islamic or conventional, is of the same nature of gambling; a group of people each 
contributs money against uncertain value, i.e. the compensation. The insurer, on the other hand, 
exchanges the premium against excessively uncertain counter value, i.e. the surplus. Although 
the compensation amount might be certain in some kinds of insurance but the very payment of 
the compensation remains probable and uncertain.3 In fact, uncertainty is inherent in insurance in 
general, but it may be in the amount of the compensation, its very payment or the time of its 
payment. The only difference, however, between gambling and insurance is in the objective of 
the participants, in gambling it is basically enrichment while in insurance it is the protection 
against a possible loss.  
 
THE GHARAR INVOLVED IN INSURANCE IS MAJOR 
Shariah tolerates gharar in contracts as long as it is minor, like in selling one of two 
commodities without specifying which one exactly in the contract so long as the differences in 
their features is inconsequential and has no impact on the price, or when the asset is agreed to be 
delivered in the future during a short range of time without specifying an exact date. Another21 
      q2q1 obvious example of the minor gharar 
is in buying a buffet dinner; the amount of food customers/ may consume differs from one 
customer to anoth qnhdety8er, but yet the price payable by all customers is the same. Minor 
gharar is tolerated because it normally does not lead, as per commercial custom, to a dispute 
between the contracting parties, and because it has no relevance to gambling. However, unlike 
the minor gharar, major gharar invalidates contracts for it amounts to gambling as in selling of 
unknown contents of a sealed box or in buying a commodity with an identified price, like 
whatever is in buyer’s wallet. It may also lead to dispute between the contracting parties due to 
the uncertaintly of some of the contract elements. Obviously, insurance harbors major gharar 
due to its relevance to gambling and the major uncertainty involved therein as described above.4 
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GHARAR IS TOLERATED IN CONTRACTS OF DONATION NATURE 
It is one of the established Shariah rules, though not unanimously agreed upon, that gharar does 
not invalidate contracts of donations.5 This is because contracts of donations do not involve 
exchange of counter values as one being the price of the other and therefore, the gharar that may 
be involved in donations does not normally cause dispute or potentially result in unjust 
appropriation of wealth. What the beneficiary obtains in these contracts comes free of charge 
leaving thus no room for dispute or exploitation. 
 
RULES OF DONATIONS 
In order for an act to be truly characterized as tabarru’ some conditions need to be observed: 
First, the intention of the giver must be tabarru’, i.e. commanding no request of a counter 
value. In fact, it is for this reason that some schools of Islamic law judge the gift on condition of 
reward as a sale contract. This is reflected in the Fiqh maxim “Contracts are judged by their 
essence and purposes, not by their form or structure” )ينابملاو ظافللأل لا يناعملاو دصاقملل دوقعلا يف ةربعلا(. 6 
Second, the donor cannot claim back what he has donated; if the donation was made on 
condition that he would be given the right to claim back his donation or part thereof, then this is 
not a real donation.7  
Third, the donor cannot restrict the beneficiary in the way he uses or disposes of the donation, 
because once something has been donated it becomes the property of the beneficiary and 
consequently, he has the right to use it or dispose it as he may wish. 8   
The above rules of donation are of a special importance for judging the Takaful models which 
are said to be built on the basis of donation. If any donation-based Takaful fails to fulfill these 
rules then its basis is void.  
 
Analysis of the Donation-Based Takaful Model 
Most of the existing Takaful companies mention donation as basis for their structure following 
the model outlined in the AAOIFI Takaful standard. The following is a critical analysis of this 
structure. 
The Contractual Relationships 
There are three contractual relationships in the donation-based Takaful as per AAOIFI: 
a) Musharaka (partnership) among the contributors to the fund. 
b) Wakala (agency) between the company and the policy holders’ fund for managing the Takaful 
fund and investing its assets against fixed fees. Investing the fund’s assets, however, can be 
achieved through Mudaraba instead of Wakala according to AAOIFI.  
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c) Donation relationship between the policy holders and the fund which takes the form of 
donation commitment at the stage of making contributions, and indemnification commitment at 
the stage of providing compensation for injury as per regulations. 
 
CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS 
- One can easily notice that this characterization of the contractual relationships in Takaful 
evades admitting any contractual relationship between the policy holders and the operating 
company, which is absurd. To the proponents of the tabarru’ model, the participants cannot 
contract with the operating company because their conduct is of a donation nature, which has 
nothing to do with a commutative (mu’awada) contract like Wakala or Mudaraba. Once 
participants have made their donations, they lose all rights and control over their donations 
and therefore the Takaful operator needs to contract other party to manage the fund, and to 
the AAOIFI standard this party is the fund itself, which is really absurd. The fund practically 
does not have any legal entity here; it is not registered as legal entity so that it can contract 
with others or admit legal action taken against it in case of litigations. In fact giving it an 
independent character is purely hypothetical and is only meant to theoretically validate what 
would otherwise be invalid from Shariah point of view. Besides, the fund is controlled and 
administered by the operating company so the company will be effectively contracting with 
itself in Wakala or Mudaraba or in best scenario combining between two conflicting 
contractual capacities; a case which is not accepted in Shariah due to the occurrence of 
conflict of interests. 9 
- Unlike in any legal entity, there is no one in this described structure to stand for the fund’s 
rights against the operating company, nor is there one to stand against the fund in fulfillment 
of its obligations, while legal entities have either shareholders, societies or the government, 
as in case of charities like Waqf, to stand for their rights and obligations. And since the fund 
manager (the company) benefits from the surplus via an incentive clause as in most Takaful 
structures, then it tends not to act in the interest of the participants when it comes to payment 
of the compensations, which renders the fund nondependent in its relationship with the 
participants, causes disputes and creates conflict of interests. 
- Gharar in Shariah is tolerated in donations because its existence therein does not cause any 
harm to the beneficiaries. If one makes his donation conditional on an uncertain event like 
the occurrence of an accident, or he initiates a statement to the donation of an unknown 
amount of money, no harm will either way befall the beneficiary, because whatever donated 
is a bonus that comes free of charge. If this is the case, then characterizing the fund’s 
commitment to pay compensations to the participants as a commitment to donation is invalid, 
because, unlike in the true donations, nonpayment of the compensation will inflict 
considerable harm upon the participants, for they have paid the premium only in expectation 
of receiving the compensation when needed. Thus, the gharar inherent in the payment of the 
compensations cannot be tolerated because these compensations cannot be regarded as 
donations in the first place. 
- The indemnification commitment on the part of the fund towards the participants brings in 
the Mu’awada element which invalidates the structure, because a commitment to give 
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donation against a counter commitment to do the same is nothing but Mu’awada, and if this 
is the case then the resulting gharar would invalidate it as highlighted earlier. 
- Finally, the characterization of any contract should always be reflective of the reality of this 
contract and the purpose of the contractors, and one cannot dictate a certain intention on the 
contractors then judge the contract accordingly just to invalidate what would otherwise be 
invalid.  In fact, tabarru’ is odd and irrelevant to the real intentions of the participants, so to 
dictate upon them such intention functions against the very objective of contracts in general- 
which is to translate intended purposes into deeds - and therefore it cannot be accepted. 
Furthermore, it is a common practice of Takaful institutions, similar to conventional 
insurance, that if a policy holder cancels his subscription he will be refunded an amount of 
his premium proportionate to the remaining policy period. In fact, this very action of 
matching the premium with policy period is a practical evidence for the reality of the 
premium being far from tabarru’, because if it was a donation then the policy holder would 
not be entitled to any refund in case of cancellation of policy.  
 
THE CORE STRUCTURAL PROBLEM OF THE DONATION-BASED TAKAFUL MODEL 
The main problem with the existing structure of Takaful lies basically with the legal 
characterization of the entity of the Takaful fund and its relationship with the participants. 
According to the dominant structure, which is based on AAOIFI standards, the participant 
commits him/herself to donate an amount (the premium) to the Takaful fund on condition that 
the fund in return undertakes to compensate the donor for specified losses. 
This characterization of the relationship between the fund and the participants seems to be 
problematic from Shariah point of view. It is an agreement between the policy holders and the 
fund which takes the form of donation commitment at the stage of making contributions, and 
indemnification commitment at the stage of providing compensation for injury or loss. (AAOIFI 
Standards, No 26, Clause 4). The problem with this arrangement is that it results in bilateral 
obligations analogous to commercial contracts in which gharar is not permitted as explained 
earlier. In fact, establishing Takaful on tabarru’ was intended to avoid the effect of gharar, but 
with this arrangement gharar will continue to invalidate the agreement since the agreement boils 
down to a commercial contract where two counter values are exchanged on Mu’awada basis: the 
premiums and the compensations. This is because Shariah judges contracts by its essence and 
spirit, not form and apparent structure, and the essence of this agreement is Mu'awada (mutual 
compensation) rather than tabarru’, and consequently the inherent gharar would render this 
Takaful structure invalid. 
 
The Waqf-Based Takaful Model 
The foregoing discussion shows that in order for the Shariah scholars to Islamize the notion of 
insurance, they had to strip it down then build it on tabarru’ basis in order to prevent the gharar 
inherent in insurance contracts in general from invalidating the Takaful contracts, but this led to 
another caution which was the legal justification of the participants’ right to the compensations. 
This was thought to be solved by giving the fund a legal capacity to accept the donations and 
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give counter commitment to donations, but this did not solve the problem because the opposite 
commitments between the participants and the fund was effectively Mu’awada. 
The Waqf-based Takaful model is an attempt to avoid the suspicion of Mu’awada resulting 
from the mutual commitments to donation between the Takaful fund and the policy holders. The 
concept and mechanism are as follows:  
- The Takaful company establishes and independent Waqf fund by contributing part of its cash 
capital to this fund whereby the beneficiaries are the potential Takaful policy holders. The 
issue of establishing cash as Waqf should not raise a Shariah concern even though cash is 
consumable and Waqf is supposed to be permanent, because cash Waqf was accepted by 
some Fiqh schools,10 and the same opinion was also adopted by AAOIFI standard on Waqf. 
(AAOIFI Standards, No 33, Clause 3/3/4/3). However, in case of cash Waqf the cash has to 
be invested and only its proceeds can be given to the beneficiaries; alternatively, the cash can 
be lent to the beneficiaries to be later paid back by them. 
- The participants pay their premiums as donations to the Waqf fund and not as cash Waqf, and 
donating the Waqf should also not raise a Shariah concern because there are some Fatawa 
(Shariah legal opinions by scholars) in the classical literature of Islamic law allowing 
donation of cash to the Waqf, like donating Mosques some cash money to be spent in their 
maintenance.11 The reason, however, to consider the premiums as donations to the Waqf and 
not as cash Waqf is to validate payment of the compensations from these donations, because 
what is Waqf cannot be donated since Waqf is supposed to be permanent, while the proceeds 
from investing the cash Waqf will not be enough to cover the compensations. 
- The Takaful operator manages the Waqf fund (the Takaful fund) with respect to the Takaful 
operations on Wakala basis, and invests the fund’s cash on Wakala or Mudaraba basis.  
- Being the beneficiaries of the Waqf fund, the policy holders receive upon the occurrence of 
loss the compensations from the Waqf fund.  
Apparently, Waqf-based Takaful model solves the problem of Mu’awada resulting from the 
mutual commitments to donation, because the policy holders are the beneficiaries of the fund so 
they are naturally entitled to its wealth and therefore, there is no need to obtain from the Takaful 
fund a counter commitment to donation to the policy holders. 
This is simply the basic structure of the Waqf-based Takaful, and it is worth noting that some 
Takaful institutions were established on this basis, like TAKAFUL SA in South Africa.12 
 
Critical Review of the Waqf-Based Takaful Model 
Apart from the discourse on whether the structure of this model meets the objectives of the 
participants as well as the Takaful operators, it is obvious that the structure of this model 
overlooks one important point which relates to the policy holders getting their donations back 
through receipt of the compensations. Although the policy holders appear to be the beneficiaries 
of the Waqf fund but here they are donating money and then getting the donations back. 
AbuGhudda, a proponent of this model, attempts to refute this argument by claiming that “what 
the participants get of compensations is not in exchange of their donations but rather an 
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independent payment from the Waqf fund for they are the beneficiaries of this fund, and the 
Waqif (the founder of the Waqf) himself may become a beneficiary, while the compensations 
received are not in exchange of the Waqf they made”  (AbuGhudda, Waqf-based Takaful as 
substitute to the donation-based Takaful, p.10).  
As a matter of fact, this argument is not in line with the very structure of the Waqf model, 
because the policy holders are not among the Waqf founders but rather donors to the Waqf as the 
same writer proclaims elsewhere “The Waqf-based Takaful uses the principle of donating to the 
Waqf rather than paying the premium as Waqf” (AbuGhudda, p.7). Considering the premiums as 
donations and not as cash Waqf is necessitated by the fact that what is Waqf is supposed to be 
permanent so deeming the premiums as Waqf then repaying the same as compensations will 
result in draining the Waqf, because regardless of how much profit these premiums can make in 
investment they fall short to cover the Takaful compensations. 
Thus, the premiums have to be treated as donations and not as Waqf, otherwise they cannot be 
spent in payment of the compensations, and if this is the case then the policy holders will be 
getting back their donations, which breaches the rules of donations as detailed earlier. Besides, if 
what the policy holders receive does not effectively emanates from their capacity as Waqf 
beneficiaries, then what they get is a counter value in exchange of their contributions, and this 
triggers Mu’awada and thus renders this Takaful structure invalid due to the presence of gharar, 
which dominates the core of any insurance business. Therefore, the Waqf-based Takaful fails to 
offer a real solution to the Mu’awada problem as it reverts back to the same problematic point of 
the tabarru’ model. 
 
The Proposed Model for Takaful 
The Structure and the Contractual Relationships   
The past discussions show that the structures of the existing Takaful models have some 
unresolved Shariah issues and most importantly, they imply Mu’awada so that the gharar 
inherent in insurance business in general may invalidate them like it does to any other 
commercial contract. 
What adds to the unacceptability of the aforementioned models is the intention of the 
participants being far from giving donations. 
Thus, in order for any proposed structure to be valid it must not be of a commutative nature so 
that the inherent gharar in Takaful will not invalidate its contracts.  Besides, it must be in line 
with the real intention and objective of the participants. 
The alternative model this paper proposes is to construct Takaful on what is called in Fiqh 
terminology “Ibaha”. With Ibaha one puts at the disposal of others something consumable and 
allows them to consume it. He, however, remains its owner so the leftover, if any, belongs to 
him. A simple example of Ibaha is in the practice of offering guests food or drinks by the host. 
By offering the food, the host permits his guest to eat it; however, doing so does not entail 
transferring the ownership of the food from the host to the guest, but rather the host remains its 
owner and has the right to take it away, share it with the guest and keep the leftover.  Although 
Ibaha has some similarity with donation, it is still significantly different since the object of Ibaha 
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remains the property of the Mubih (the doer of Ibaha), unlike donation where the donated object 
becomes no longer the property of the donor. This difference is of a particular importance if to 
apply Ibaha to Takaful as the participants will remain then the owners of the Takaful fund and so 
have access to the compensations without the need to justify it through a counter commitment 
from the fund and consequently, the arrangement remains beyond the scope of Mu’awada. 
Hence, if the contributions made by the participants are constructed on Ibaha basis all Shariah 
legal problem of Takaful will be solved. The inherent gharar will not invalidate its contracts, the 
participants will remain the owners of the fund and the surplus will specifically belong to them. 
Now in order for this arrangement to be sound and acceptable, three points need to be 
ascertained. 
First, whether ibaha is similar to donation in its capability of neutralizing the effect of gharar 
on contracts like normal donation does. 
Second, whether the reciprocal commitments of the participants to offer their contributions on 
Ibaha basis render the arrangement of a Mu’awada nature and consequently the inherent gharar 
invalidates it. 
Third, whether the object given on Ibaha basis enters the ownership of the party to whom the 
Ibaha is made. This is because if it enters his ownership then the giver (participant) may not get 
what it gave and so cannot benefit from the compensation unless through a counter commitment, 
which again brings in the Mu’awada element. 
To address the first point, it was reported by al-Bukhari that Nihd, which is the practice of 
Ibaha in travel whereby travelers contribute their foods on the start of the journey and share them 
together till the end of the journey as Ibn Hajar explained in his explanatory work on Sahih al-
Bukhari 13, was commonly practiced by Muslims and it received no Shariah objection by the 
scholars.14 This report shows that although Nihd involves gharar emerging from the unequal 
contribution and unequal consumption of food, it was accepted due to the purpose behind it 
being that of mutual cooperation. Al-‘ini says: “Nothing wrong with it (Nihd), for it is based on 
Ibaha and meant for mutual cooperation”. (Al-‘ini, Umdat al-Qari 19/371) 
With respect to the second point, it can be again said that the very permissibility of Nihd, as 
stated by al-Bukhari, Ibn Hajra and Al-‘ini is clear evidence that the reciprocal Ibaha 
commitments of the participants do not render the agreement Mu’awada.  
To address the Third point, Al-‘ini in his explanatory work on Sahih al-Bukhari very clearly 
mentions that Ibaha does not involve transfer of ownership “This action (Nihd) cannot be 
regarded as donation, for donation involves transfer of ownership while this (Nihd) is Ibaha and 
Ibaha does not involve transfer of ownership”. (Al-‘ini 19/371) 
However, to ensure that Ibaha in Takaful does not involve transfer of title and so avoid the 
occurrence of Mu’awada, the Takaful surplus must remain the property of the participants as 
discussed below. 
 
The Insurance Surplus 
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The surplus can be defined as “the residual premiums of the participants in addition to the 
reserves and profits, after deducting all expenses and indemnity amounts” (AAOIFI Standards, 
No 26, P.488 Appendix c: Definitions) 
Treatment of the Takaful surplus is the most important practical aspect of Takaful business 
that ascertains its difference from the conventional insurance. This is because, the legal 
characterization of the Takaful structure remains theoretical in essence and it is not normally 
observed by the participants when subscribing to Takaful, not to mention its debatable validity.    
 
Treatment of the Surplus According to the Donation Model 
According to the Tabarru’ model neither the participants nor the Takaful operator own the 
surplus. This is because the participants have already donated the premiums so they do not own 
the fund and consequently, they do not own the surplus, which is the leftover of the premiums. 
The Takaful operator, on the other hand, cannot be given any ownership right over the surplus, 
because its owning the surplus entails prior ownership of the premiums, which in turn renders 
Takaful a Mu’awada business as justified earlier. “The managing company is not entitled to any 
share of the surplus” (AAOIFI Standards, No 26, 5/5). 
So what to do with the surplus if the financial statement of a Takaful company shows any? 
According to AAOIFI Takaful Standard, which advocates the Tabarru’  model, “disposal of the 
surplus should be in a way that serves the cause or common interest of the participants, such as 
accumulation of reserves, reduction of the contribution, charitable donations and partial/full 
distribution of the surplus among the participants. (AAOIFI Standards, No 26, 5/5). 
One of the observations one may have over this AAOIFI clause is how can the charitable 
donation of the surplus serve the common interest of the participants?! As a matter of fact, 
Takaful operators do not consult the policy holders on how to dispose of the surplus, and the 
policy holders have no choice but to accept what is dictated on them in the Takaful policies, and 
their implicit objection to dispose of the surplus in a way that does not benefit them financially is 
very likely. Therefore, the very action of giving the company the right to dispose of the surplus 
according to its own discretion may function against the very interests of the participants, like 
when donating the surplus to charity despite the participants’ implicit objection.  
Besides, it has been noted from the actual practices of the Takaful companies that many of 
them seize the surplus or a significant part thereof under the pretext of incentive for good 
management.15 The Saudi Arabia monetary agency, for example, has approved 10% of the 
Takaful surplus to be redistributed to the participants and 90% to the shareholders of the 
operating company as an incentive! Similarly, HSBC Amanah Takaful takes 80% of the surplus 
as incentive for its performance in managing the fund and distributes only 20% amongst eligible 
participants. (Gulf Region Takaful Report, 2011). 
 
Treatment of the Surplus According to the Waqf Model 
Treatment of the surplus according to this model is no different from that of the donation model 
“The Waqf fund may initiate any self-commitment with respect to the surplus, like to commit 
itself to keep the surplus as a reserve to cover possible deficit in next years or to distribute all or 
part of it among the policy holders” (AbuGhudda, p.11). 
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Treatment of the Surplus According to the Proposed Model 
Since the participants in Takaful are deemed the owners of its fund, the residual of the fund after 
payment of compensations shall specifically belong to them. In fact, the Takaful surplus is just 
like the leftover in Nihd, and since the leftover in Nihd is redistributable among the participants, 
the participants in Takaful shall also have the right to redistribute the surplus among themselves 
or to instruct the Takaful operator to dispose it of according to their genuine will. Under no 
circumstances, however, can the Takaful operator be entitled to the surplus, for this will abolish 
the very concept of Ibaha and drag the Takaful arrangement into the sphere of Mu’awada as 
indicated earlier. 
Hence, the Takaful operator should dispose the surplus as prescribed by the participants, but 
as an investment agent he may be given form the surplus a reasonable incentive for his good 
management of the Takaful fund if he was really found to be a good manager. 
 
 
Possible Forms of Surplus Distribution among the Participants 
Surplus distribution, which best serves the interest of the participants and best meets the non-
tabarru’ nature of Takaful arrangement, may upon the agreement of the participants take one of 
the following forms:16 
1. Distribution of the surplus among the participants in proportion to their respective contributions, 
and regardless of whether the participant has received indemnity during the financial period or 
not. 
2. Distribution of the surplus among participants after deducting the amounts of indemnity they 
receive during the same financial period. 
3. Distribution of the surplus among the participants who have not received indemnity during the 
financial period. 
It is possible too that every participant be given the choice to utilize his share in the surplus in 
getting a discount on the premium payable upon renewal of the Takaful policy. 
 
Other Important Shariah Issues 
Deficit in the Takaful Fund 
According to AAOIFI, which adopts the Tabarru’ model,  "when the insurance assets along with 
indemnities received from re-insurance companies- if any- fall short of covering indemnity 
commitments, the Company may cover the deficit from qard hasan (interest-free or benevolent 
loan) debited to the account of the insurance fund. In this regard, the deficits resulting from 
commitments of the current year may be covered from the surpluses of the succeeding years. The 
Company may also claim settlement of the deficit from policy holders if they undertake to do so 
in the insurance policy”. (AAOIFI Standards, No 26, 10/18). 
This standard obviously allows Takaful companies to undertake to repeatedly lend the 
Takaful fund amounts needed to cover the deficit, and the lent amounts can be repaid from the 
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surpluses of the succeeding years. Similar stand was taken by the proponents of the Waqf 
model.17 
This matter, however, raises the following concerns: 
- The widespread practice of allowing the Takaful operator to both seize the surplus through the 
incentive and cover all claims through the lending undertaking verily eliminates any practical 
difference from conventional insurance and drag the whole arrangement to the sphere of 
Mu’awada; the very reason for prohibiting conventional insurance. This is because what the 
company facilitates as supposedly a loan is not a loan in reality since the loan will not be 
effectively repaid.  Seizing the surplus, or a significant part thereof, by the Takaful company (the 
lender) under the pretext of the incentive does not enable the company to effectively get its loan 
back, for it will be getting back what is already its and thus the loans remain unpaid. Besides, 
even in the absence of the incentive clause, Wakala fee becomes too high to leave behind any 
significant amount to repay the loan incurred in the previous year(s). In fact, Takaful operators 
cannot deny that their profit simply vanishes or turn into loss in cases of deficit, which should 
not be the case if the Takaful operator is merely a lender and an agent to administer the Takaful 
operations and fund.  
- The policy holders change every year, so it is unfair and unaccepted from Shariah point of view 
that the policy holders of a given year be responsible for the loans incurred by the policy holders 
of the previous year and thus be denied the surplus, which is supposed to be distributed “in a way 
that serves the cause or common interest of the participants” as the very AAOIFI standard reads. 
(AAOIFI Standards, No 26, 5/5). 
- Shariah prohibits combining together a loan with any commutative contract, like sale, Wakala or 
Mudaraba contract in one transaction.18 The reason for this prohibition is the fear that one 
contractor may demand from the other a higher compensation in exchange of his undertaking to 
grant him a loan and thus the loan would involve then a hidden or indirect interest. Very clearly, 
Takaful structure involves Wakala and possibly Mudaraba, so adding a contract of loan to it 
should not be allowed either. In fact, this is the very reason why AAOIFI Sukuk standard 
disallows the sukuk manager, be him a Mudarib (Mudaraba manager) or a partner or an 
investment agent, to undertake to grant loans to the sukuk holders. (AAOIFI, Fatwa Council, 
Appendix 2). Therefore, AAOIFI’s stand on the loan granting issue should be consistent in these 
two standards. The prohibition however remains, in the writer’s opinion, purely technical if loans 
were not associated with any increase in the compensations of the other contracts. 
Hence, the undertaking by the Takaful operator to give loans in case of deficit harbors some 
controversies and most importantly, it brings the structure of Takaful closer to Mu’awada which 
is embodied in the simple formula of ‘premiums against claims’; the very reason for prohibiting 
the conventional commercial insurance. 
 
TREATMENT OF DEFICIT ACCORDING TO THE PROPOSED MODEL   
The status of the Takaful operator according to this model is basically no different; it is an agent 
responsible for managing the Takaful operations and administering the Takaful fund against the 
Wakala fees. Therefore, Takaful operator should have no responsibility whatsoever for any 
deficit in the Takaful fund due to excess in claims. If, however, the deficit has resulted from 
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mismanagement in handling both or one responsibility then the operating company can be made 
liable towards the policy holders for the amount lost as a result of  the mismanagement, and no 
liability beyond that can be assumed by the company. The fund on the other hand is owned by 
the policy holders according to this model, and so they should be responsible for the 
repercussions of having a shortfall. Therefore, upon the occurrence of a shortfall, the operator 
may ask the existing policy holders to top up their contributions or else he may terminate their 
policies. Alternatively, Takaful companies may subscribe to re-Takaful companies, which can 
also be structured on the same Ibaha basis, to meet deficit cases. Lending the Takaful fund 
remains an invalid option in this model for two reasons: the suspicion of combining between 
loan and Mu’awada contract, if to observe the outward prohibition, and the fact that the fund 
belongs to the policy holders according to this model, which means that they are the borrowers, 
and since they keep changing, the operator will not be possibly able to get the money back from 
the same borrowers. 
 
Investing the Takaful Fund on Wakala or Mudaraba Basis 
Managing the Takaful operations cannot be done on Mudaraba basis because the action of 
Takaful operations management is not of investment nature while Mudaraba is an investment 
contract; however, it can be achieved through Wakala against fixed fees. What could be 
potentially managed on Mudaraba basis is the investment of the Takaful fund. AAOIFI Takaful 
standard allows investment of the Takaful fund by the Takaful operator to be done on Wakala or 
Mudaraba basis. (AAOIFI Standards, No 26, Clause 4) 
However, on the other hand, management of the Takaful fund is achievable through Wakala 
contract whereby the Takaful company gets a fixed fee in advance, and since managing the 
Takaful operations is supposed to be through Wakala as well, both actions can be achieved based 
on one Wakala agreement so that any Takaful company can demand for instance 20% of the 
premiums in return of managing the Takaful operations as well as investing the Takaful fund. 
 
Conclusion: The Parameters for a Proper Islamic Insurance 
Based on the above discussions the following parameters must be observed while structuring or 
outlining the rules of any valid Takaful model:   
- The legal characterization of the relationship between the payers of the premiums and the 
payer of the compensations must reflect the real intentions of these parties, because 
contracts are supposed to reflect the real purposes of the contractors, instead of some 
devised purposes being dictated on contractors for sake of superficially validating the 
contract, and it must not result ultimately in Mu’awada as implied in the mutual 
commitment to donations. 
- The Takaful fund cannot be owned by the Takaful company, otherwise the gharar-loaded 
Mu’awada between the premiums and the compensations will take effect. Hence, the 
Takaful fund must be financially as well as legally independent of the company. 
- Since the Takaful company does not own the Takaful fund it consequently cannot seize 
its surplus in any way, and the surplus should rather be distributed among the participants 
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or disposed of according to their genuine will. Seizing the surplus by the Takaful 
company by any means renders the company the owner of the fund, which jeopardizes 
the very structure of Takaful and gives rise to the gharar-loaded Mu’awada. 
- The Takaful company may not undertake to cover claims beyond the limit of the Takaful 
fund or to give loans to cover the deficit, because the company is merely an agent to 
manage the Takaful operations and invest the Takaful fund, so it cannot be responsible 
for any deficit in the Takaful fund except in case of mismanagement. Failure to observe 
this rule eliminates the real and practical differences between Takaful and the 
conventional insurance; especially that such a practice is normally accompanied with 
seizing the surplus, limiting thus the difference between the Islamic and the conventional 
insurance to the merely hypothetical characterization of the structure and contractual 
relationships. 
- For managing the Takaful operations and investing the Takaful fund it is recommended 
to use one Wakala contract fot both actions. 
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1 Fiqh Academy issued a resolution introducing cooperative insurance, or one based on Tabarru’, as 
alternative to conventional insurance. See the resolution dated: December 22-28, 1985.  
2 Al-Qarafi, Al-Forouq, 1/151. 
3 Given the less probability of wining in gambling and the higher probability of getting the compensation 
in insurance, fortune seekers may use insurance illegally for sake of enrichment. Reports show that some 
insurance policy holders may fake an accident or death to get the compensation.  
4 For this reason Fiqh Academy issued a resolution prohibiting conventional insurance. Date of resolution 
is December 22-28, 1985.  
5 Al-Qarafi, Al-Forouq, 1/151. 
6 This Fiqh maxi is originally derived from the famous Hadith “matters are determined by intention” ( امنإ(
تاينلاب لامعلأا. (This Hadith was narrated by Omar bin Al-khattab (ra). See Sahih al-Bokhari, 1/3, Hadith 
No (1); Sahih Muslim, 3/1515, Hadith No (1907)-); Ibn Nujaim, Zainulddin, Al-Ashbah Wal  Naza’ir, 
1/34; Al-Seyoti, Jalaulddin,  Al-Ashbah Wal Naza’ir, p.21; Al-Kurdi, Ahmad.  Al-Madkhil Al-Fiqhi, p.33. 
7 Not to give the donor the right to demand back his gift or donation while it is still in the procession of 
the beneficiary is the opinion of the vast majority of Shariah schools. (Ibn Qudama, Al-Mughni, 5/175) 
8 Ibn Abedeen. Hashiyat (Rad al-Mukhtar ala al-Dur al-Mukhtar), 4/188. 
9 For details on the matter of combining between two conflicting contractual capacities in one contractor 
see Abozaid Abdulazeem, Al-Murabaha and its Modern Applications in the Islamic Banks, p 187. 
10 Ibn al-Humam, Sharih Fat’h Al-Qadeer, 6/203 . 
11 Al-Fatawa Al-Hindiyya mentions that “If a man donates a dirham to a mosque, whether to be spent in 
its renovation or maintenance, it is valid donation because the mosque has the capacity to own things”.  
2/460. 
12 Jakhhura, Bilal Ahmed, The Application of Takaful Based on the Waqf Model in South Africa, p. 2. 
13 Ibn Hajar, Fat’h Al-Bari, 5/129. 
14 Al-Bukharia, Sahih al-Bukhari, Chapter 47, Sub chapter 1, p. 436. 
15 For more details on this matter see Qaradaghi,  “The Surplus in Takaful Companies” a paper presented 
during the second Takaful conference held in Riyadh, 6-7 October, 2010. 
16 This way of surplus distribution is similar to the one adopted by AAOIFI Standards (No 26, Clause 12). 
17 Jakhhura, Bilal Ahmed, The Application of Takaful Based on the Waqf Model in South Africa, p. 13. 
18 For more details on this issue see al-Dasuqi, Hashiyah, P.76; Abozaid, Cotemporary Modes of Islamic 
Finance between Contractual Technicalities and Shariah Objectives, P. 17. 
